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DUE PROCESS IN ISLAMIC CRIMINAL IAW 
SADIQ REZA* 
ABSTRACT 
Rules and principles of due process in criminal law-how to, and 
how not to, investigate crime and criminal suspects, prosecute the 
accused, adjudicate criminal cases, and punish the convicted-appear 
in the traditional sources of Islamic law: the Quran, the Sunna, and 
classical jurisprudence. But Jew of these rules and principles are fol-
lowed in the modem-day practice of Islamic criminal law. Rather, states 
that claim to practice Islamic criminal law today mostly follow laws and 
practices of criminal procedure that were adopted from European nations 
in the twentieth century, without reference to the constraints and protec-
tions of Islamic law itself. To enforce Islam's criminal prohibitions and 
punishments without recognizing and heeding its own procedural rul.es 
and principles is to prosecute and punish unjustly. What constitutes 
criminal due process from an Islamic perspective must therefore be identi-
fied, articulated, and enforced. The result would be greater compliance 
with both Islamic norms and international standards of human rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of the most visible and controversial applications of 
Islamic law today occur in criminal law. Reports of prosecutions 
and punishments under Islamic law (sharia) regularly attract world-
wide attention, and justifiable condemnation, from Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. 1 Only about a dozen of the world's forty-four 
Muslim-majority countries formally practice Islamic criminal law. 
In most of those countries that practice began only recently as part 
of state "Islamization" programs undertaken over the past thirty to 
forty years; but criminal law has been a central aspect of those pro-
grams. 2 In current Islamization efforts too, the institution of so-
* Professor, New York Law School. J.D. 1991, Harvard Law School; A.B. 1986, 
Princeton University. 
1. See, e.g., Robert F. Worth, Crime (Sex) and Punishment (Stoning), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
2010, at WK.I (discussing stoning for adultery in the context of recent cases in Afghanistan 
and Iran). 
2. See RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAw 142-45, 153 (2005) 
("Islamic criminal law ... has a highly symbolic value and its introduction is regarded by 
many Muslims as the litmus test of real Islamisation of the legal system."). 
I 
2 The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 46 
called Islamic criminal prosecutions and punishments is routinely 
a key component.3 
The list of crimes and punishments that shape the modem-day 
practice of Islamic criminal law-the framework of a sharia penal 
code-was established over a thousand years ago. This framework 
consists of categories of forbidden acts and accompanying penal-
ties that early Muslim scholars derived from Islam's sacred texts 
and primary sources of law-the Quran and the Sunna (Tradi-
tions )-through standard jurisprudential methods. Early scholars 
also set out rules of court procedure, such as the order of proof, 
witness qualifications, and other evidentiary burdens. But the 
scholars never set out a corresponding set of rules that govern offi-
cials in investigating suspected offenders and prosecuting them in 
terms of limitations that bind the state and rights that accrue to 
suspects and defendants in the process-i.e., a framework of pro-
tections for individuals in the criminal process, such as those in the 
Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution. Nor has such a framework 
been established in modern times. As a result, modem-day systems 
of Islamic criminal law enforce criminal prohibitions and punish-
ments originating from Islamic doctrines that are up to fourteen 
hundred years old, but operate mostly under codes and practices 
of procedure that were adopted from European nations in the 
twentieth century. 
Thus, states that enforce sharia criminal prohibitions and pun-
ishments today do so mostly according to procedural rules and 
principles that did not originate to govern Islamic criminal law. 
This makes for a significant anomaly in the contemporary practice 
of Islamic criminal law (and, accordingly, in modern Islamization 
efforts more broadly), an anomaly of practical as well as theoretical 
dimensions. For although there is no formal framework or system 
of criminal procedure in Islamic legal theory, the Quran does con-
tain rules and principles that address criminal procedure in the 
modern sense-namely: how to, and how not to, investigate crime 
and criminal suspects, prosecute accused offenders, adjudicate 
criminal cases, and punish convicted offenders.4 So too, indeed 
even more so, do the Traditions, which compile the statements and 
3. See, e.g., Tim Lindsey & Jeremy Kingsley, Talking in Code: Legal Islamisation in Indo-
nesia and the MM/ Shari'a Criminal Code, in THE LAw APPLIED: CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC 
SHARI'A 295, 301-02 (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2008) (discussing such efforts in Indonesia 
and Malaysia). 
4. The topic of punishment straddles the substance/procedure divide in criminal 
law in all legal systems, at least in contemporary Western scholarship. For instance, what 
specific penalty a given crime carries is seen as a matter of substance; how to reach that 
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practices of the Prophet Muhammad (the Prophet) and his earliest 
followers (the Companions), and thus constitute the most authori-
tative body of precedents in Islamic law. These rules and principles 
have been recognized and restated by Muslim legal scholars from 
classical times to today, often in the very same texts in which the 
substantive criminal prohibitions and penalties are discussed. As 
explained below, some of these rules and principles limit the 
power of the state in enforcing Islam's criminal prohibitions. 
Others provide what we see today as guarantees of individual liber-
ties in the criminal process. Still others appear to serve different 
purposes, perhaps effectuating divine goals that are not immedi-
ately apparent, or at least that are not easily placed on the mod-
ern/ secular spectrum of the state versus the individual. But few of 
these rules or principles appear to be recognized or followed in the 
modern-day practice of Islamic criminal law. 
To enforce Islam's criminal prohibitions and punishments with-
out recognizing and heeding its accompanying procedural rules 
and principles, whatever their content and import, is to practice 
Islamic criminal law inaccurately and incompletely-indeed, "unis-
lamically." More concretely, doing so arguably results in injustice 
from an Islamic point of view-be it injustice to the individual, to 
the state, to the community, or in God's eyes alone. "Islamic" crim-
inal law cannot, in other words, consist simply of imposing and 
enforcing the criminal prohibitions and penalties that appear in 
the sacred texts. It must also consist of how those prohibitions and 
penalties are enforced-what rules and principles govern that 
enforcement. What constitutes criminal due process from an 
Islamic perspective-i.e., the Islamic framework of human rights in 
criminal practice-must therefore be identified and articulated. 
This Article frames and begins the task of identifying those rules 
and principles. And the inquiry aims at more than just regulating 
the practice of Islamic criminal law-"Islamizing" that practice, if 
you will. There is much to be learned about Islamic law in its rules 
and principles of criminal due process. And there is much to be 
learned from those rules and principles, for purposes of compara-
tive-law study. The inquiry also identifies common ground 
between opposing camps in current-day battles over the role and 
content of Islamic law in modern states: Muslim "traditionalists" 
and "progressives" alike-both those who seek to reinstate the ear-
liest and purest principles and practices of Islam, and those who 
penalty and whether to mete it out-i.e., rules of conviction and sentencing-are seen as 
matters of procedure. 
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seek to reinterpret the sacred texts for modern realities and sensi-
bilities-should be gratified to find the essentials of human rights 
in the Islamic criminal process spelled out. At the very least, those 
who urge the practice of Islamic criminal law cannot easily dismiss 
procedural rules and principles that have been articulated to gov-
ern its enforcement, while those who oppose that practice can at 
least insist that those rules and principles be honored. 
There are thus very good reasons to identify the essentials of 
criminal due process in Islam. This Article makes the case for this 
inquiry and begins it. Part I briefly explains the nature of "Islamic" 
criminal law. Part II expands on the conceptual claims above to 
frame more fully the inquiry into a corresponding "Islamic" code 
of criminal procedure. It also identifies a methodology and sug-
gests a doctrinal framework for one. Part III presents four rules or 
principles that result from the inquiry, as both illustrative examples 
and preliminary findings. Part IV offers observations on these find-
ings and the inquiry generally. 
I. "IsLAMic" CRIMINAL LAw TODAY 
Laws to enforce "Islamic" crimes and punishments have been 
enacted in several Muslim-majority countries over the past thirty-
five years-Libya (beginning in 1972), the United Arab Emirates 
(1978), Pakistan (1979), Iran (1982), the Sudan (1983), and the 
states of northern Nigeria (2000-2002) and passed but not enacted 
in two Muslim-controlled states of Malaysia (1993 and 2002).5 
Islamic criminal law is also applied by the Islamic courts that have 
arisen to govern much of Somalia over the past decade, first by the 
Islamic Courts Union and now by successor groups such as the 
Shabab.6 It has always been applied in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and 
Yemen, areas that were more or less unaffected by the wave of 
Western-style codification that swept through the Muslim world in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.7 And it can be applied in 
countries in which the law allows for its ad hoc application.8 One 
example of such ad hoc application is Afghanistan, where the 
Quranic crime of apostasy is not listed in the penal code, but never-
5. See PETERS, supra note 2, at 153-55, 161, 164, 169; Lindsey & Kingsley, supra note 
3, at 301-02 (discussing such efforts in Indonesia and Malaysia). 
6. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, SOMALIA 11 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/docu 
ments/organization/160144.pdf; The Supreme Islamic Courts Union/ al-Ittihad Mahakern al-
Islamiya (ICU), GLoBALSECURITI'.ORG (Oct. 5, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.globalsecurity 
.org/ military /world/ para/icu.htm. 
7. PETERS, supra note 2, at 143. 
8. See id. at 147. 
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theless, prosecutions for that crime are occasionally threatened 
and arguably lawful under a constitutional provision that autho-
rizes following Islamic law in matters not addressed by the constitu-
tion or other laws.9 Another example is the small island nation of 
the Maldives, which, aided by a similar catchall provision in its 
penal code, completed in 2006 (with the assistance of an American 
scholar of criminal law) a new draft penal code that includes spe-
cific Islamic crimes and punishments. 10 
The substantive scope of Islamic criminal law-what conduct is 
considered criminal, and what possible punishments follow-is rel-
atively well established in Islamic jurisprudence. On the basis of 
the Quran and the Sunna (Traditions), which are the primary 
sources of Islamic law, classical Muslim legal scholars identified 
what amount to three distinct categories of crime: (1) the handful 
of "fixed" crimes ( hudud), which call for the harsh physical punish-
ments for which Islamic criminal law is best known; (2) bodily-
injury offenses (jinayat), which call for ''.just retribution" ( qisas) or 
monetary compensation, according to the victim's wishes; and (3) 
other crimes, which constitute the vast majority of possible 
offenses, are unspecified, and call for "corrective" punishment 
(ta'zir) in the ruler's discretion. 11 One or another version of these 
categories, particularly the hudud category, provides the substantive 
framework for modem-day Islamic criminal law and practice.12 
The Quran and Traditions also give rules about the evidence 
required to prove crimes, particularly the required number and 
qualifications of witnesses, and again particularly with respect to 
hudud offenses.13 Classical scholars have developed a substantial 
body of jurisprudence on this topic as well. 14 These rules too, to 
varying degrees, apply in modem-day Islamic criminal practice. 
9. See THE CONSTITUTION OF AFG. Jan. 3, 2004, art. 130; see, e.g., Ray Rivera, Afghan 
Officials Say jailed Christian Convert is Free, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at A6; Christian Convert 
Gets Asylum, LA TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at A24. 
10. See Paul Robinson et al., Codifying Shari'a: International Nurms, Legality and the Free-
dom to Invent New Furms, 2 J. CoMP. L. 1, 3, 4 (2007). 
11. MOHAMED S. EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAw: A COMPARATNE STUDY 1-2 
( 1982). Scholars count between four and seven hudud crimes, with a majority view of six: 
theft, brigandage or mayhem, adultery or fornication, false accusation of adultery or forni-
cation, wine drinking, and apostasy. Id. at 2. The punishments for these crimes include 
flogging, amputation, and death by crucifixion or stoning. See id. at 2-3, 10-12, 15-17, 20, 
45-46, 50. 
12. PETERS, supra note 2, at 153-73. 
13. See Mohammed Selim El-Awa, Confession and Other Methods of Evidence in Islamic 
Procedural jurisprudence, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ISLAM: JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IN THE SHARI'A 
111, 117-29 (Muhammad Abdel Haleem et al. eds., 2003). 
14. See, e.g., id. 
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But a system of criminal procedure in its modern sense-rules 
that govern how crime should be investigated and prosecuted, what 
limitations bind the state, and what rights accrue to suspects and 
defendants in the process-has never been fully articulated in 
Islamic legal theory. 15 The Quran and the Sunna are traditionally 
seen as saying little directly on the subject, and pre-modern jurists 
developed no comprehensive theory or framework of criminal pro-
cedure-certainly nothing akin to the categories of substantive 
crime. Moreover, in pre-modern practice-at least from what we 
know of the Arab-Ottoman lands-matters of criminal procedure 
were governed not by jurists and religious doctrine, but by execu-
tive authorities and the rules they promulgated.16 In modern 
times, some Muslim thinkers have addressed criminal procedure 
from an Islamic jurisprudential perspective, occasionally identify-
ing pertinent Islamic principles, but more often urging conformity 
with contemporary standards of international human rights in the 
criminal process, and in either case with few specifics. 17 There is 
thus no template of procedural rules similar to the categories of 
substantive crime (and rules of evidence) in formal Islamic juris-
prudence to govern the modern state practice of Islamic criminal 
law. 
As a result, states that claim to practice Islamic criminal law today 
instead do so mostly according to the rules and principles of the 
15. See, e.g., ABDULLAH! AHMED AN-NA'IM, TowARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 124 (1990) (arguing that because early 
Muslim jurists "were naturally unaware of the currently much-appreciated need to regulate 
and control the powers of arrest, search and seizure and so forth," Islamic law "histori-
cal [ly] ... had very little to say on these [and other] vital questions of practical law 
enforcement"). 
16. See Sadiq Reza, Islam's Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure in Islamic Doctrine and 
Muslim Practice, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 703, 709 (2009). Indeed, historical studies consistently 
find that criminal law in the pre-modem Muslim world was-at least in the well-studied 
Arab-Ottoman regions-primarily investigated and prosecuted not under the authority (or 
in the courts) oflslamic-law judges ( qadis), who were the guardians of the classical jurispru-
dence, but in the quasi-courts and administrative tribunals of governors, police officers, 
and other executive authorities. See id. at 712. Records of proceedings in qadi courts have 
been unearthed from various periods and places of the pre-modem Muslim world, but 
records of these executive proceedings and dispositions are few or nonexistent. Moreover, 
all indications are that executive authorities enforced criminal law largely unconstrained 
by the jurisprudential doctrines that bound qadis-so it is unlikely they would have felt 
bound by any procedural rules that did exist. See id. at 769-70. 
17. See, e.g., AN-NA'IM, supra note 15, at 124; MAsHOOD A. BADERJN, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 89-90, 114-18 (2003); MUHAMMAD AsAD, THE PRINCIPLES 
OF STATE AND GoVERNMENT IN lsLAM 84-86 (1980) (arguing that a true Islamic state must 
protect, inter alia, citizens' "dignity and honor and the privacy of their homes," and calling 
for constitutional enactments that guarantee these protections and prohibit governments 
from violating them). 
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Western-style constitutions and codes of criminal procedure 
imported in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pakistan, for 
instance, applies the same body of procedural rules to enforce the 
"Islamic" criminal prohibitions implemented in 1979 that it applies 
to "non-Islamic" criminal proceedings: a code of criminal proce-
dure enacted in 1898 by the British-appointed Indian Law Commis-
sion.18 The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which included Islamic 
criminal prohibitions in its first unified criminal code in 1987, 
enacted five years later a code of criminal procedure much like 
that of Egypt-modeled along French lines and devoid of "Islamic" 
procedural considerations.19 In the Maldives, the Islamic penal 
code that Professor Robinson helped draft five years ago includes 
citations to the Quran and Sunna to demonstrate its grounding in 
the sharia, but it is still pending before Parliament. Yet Islamic 
criminal prosecutions occur in the Maldives on the same legal 
grounds as they do in Afghanistan: through constitutional provi-
sions that declare Islam the religion of the state and the basis of its 
laws (Articles 2, 10, 19) and allow uncodified sharia principles to 
supplement, and even trump, other legislation (Articles 16, 19, 
142, 274) .20 In both countries, these prosecutions are governed by 
the same shari(];-free procedural codes that govern non-sharia crimi-
nal enforcement: in the Maldives, a 2010 Judicature Act, and in 
Afghanistan, a 2004 Interim Criminal Procedure Code.21 
To be sure, some modern states that enforce Islamic criminal 
prohibitions have adopted or referenced at least some "Islamic" 
rules of procedure to govern that enforcement. The opening arti-
cle of Saudi Arabia's criminal procedure code, enacted in 2002, 
states that courts hearing criminal cases must apply "Shari'ah prin-
ciples, as derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah," along with regula-
tions that comply with the Code and do not contradict "the 
provisions of the Qur'an and Sunnah."22 But what "sharia" rules or 
provisions are intended is not explained, and the Code provisions 
18. SeeM. FARANI, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CooE, 1898, 40 (2004). Indeed, each of 
the four 1979 "hudud ordinances" -criminalizing illicit sex, false accusation of the same, 
theft, and intoxicants-states expressly that the 1898 code governs proceedings under the 
new legislation, with only minor technical adjustments. 
19. See Butti Sultan Butti Ali al-Muhairi, The Islamisation of Laws in the UAE: The Case of 
the Penal Code, 11 ARAB L.Q. 350, 356, 358 (1996). 
20. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES Aug. 7, 2008; THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFc. Jan. 3, 2004, art. 130. 
21. See John Jupp, Legal Transplants as Solutions fur Post-Interoention Criminal Law 
Refurm: Afghanistan's Interim Criminal Procedure Code 2004, 61 AM. J. CoMP. L. 51, 74-76 
(2013). 
22. Law of Criminal Procedure, Umm al-Qura 3867, art. 1 (2001) (Saudi Arabia). 
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themselves do not reflect a "sharia" provenance.23 Iran's 1999 
Code of Criminal Procedure, on the other hand, is replete with 
references to the sharia and Islamic norms, and many of its provi-
sions are tailored expressly for investigating and prosecuting 
"Islamic" crimes.24 The Islamic provenance of many of its provi-
sions is obvious, and at least one of the rules to be discussed below 
in this Article is set out: the prohibition against investigating "pri-
vate" acts of immorality.25 That rule does not appear to be in the 
criminal procedure codes that the states of northern Nigeria 
adopted soon after they began implementing Islamic criminal law 
in the year 2000-but that did not stop the appeals court of one of 
those states from invoking the rule as a ground for reversing the 
adultery conviction of Safiyatu Hussaini in 2001.26 Instead, the 
court cited Quranic verses, Traditions, and scholarly opinions in 
support of that rule and result, as courts are authorized to do by 
catchall provisions of other codes that allow uncodified sharia prin-
ciples to be invoked.27 In the Sudan, Islamic rules and princi-
ples of criminal procedure appear in a variety of legal sources-
a Penal Code, a Criminal Procedure Act, a Judicature Act, and 
23. See id. There are minor exceptions-for instance, the provisions on searching 
homes, which specify that a female must accompany the searching officers if a female sus-
pect is the only occupant of the home at the time of the search, id. art. 52 (implying a 
search of the suspect/arrestee, since under art. 42 only female officers may search female 
arrestees incident to arrest), and that any female occupants who are not to be searched 
must be given the opportunity to don their veils or leave the home, id. art. 53. 
24. SeeQanun-i A'yin-i Dadrisiyih Dadgahhayih Umumi va Inqilab dar Umur-i Kayfari 
[Criminal Procedure Code for Public and Revolutionary Courts] Tehran 1378 [1999] 
(Iran), translated in English Translation of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Criminal Code of Proce-
dure for Public and Revolutionary Courts, IRAN HuM. RTs. DocuMENTATION CENTER, http:// 
www.iranhrdc.org/english/english/human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/1000000026-
english-translation-of-the-islamic-republic-of-irans-criminal-code-of-procedure-for-public-
and-revolutionary-courts.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
25. See id. art. 43 (prohibiting investigating crimes of "unchaste behavior" that are not 
"obvious"); see also id. arts. 2-4 (distinguishing between crimes that implicate public rights 
and those that implicate private rights), 6(1) (allowing prosecution to be suspended upon 
plaintiffs forgiveness in qualifying crimes), 8 (suspending sentence upon same), 155 (wit-
ness qualifications). 
26. See, e.g., CTR. FOR ISLAMIC LEGAL STUDIES, HARMONISED SHARIA CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE CoDE BASED ON THE HARMONISED SHARIA PENAL CODE, in 4 SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN 
NORTHERN NIGERIA 1996-2006: A SouRCEBOOK 221, 222 (Philip Ostien ed., 2007); see also 
Hussaini v. State, [2001] (Nigeria), translated in Proceedings and judgment in the Sharia Court 
of Appea~ 5 SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 1996-2006: A SOURCEBOOK 26, 
47-49 (Philip Ostien ed., 2007). 
27. Philip Ostien, Introduction to Chapter 5, in 4 SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN NORTHERN 
NIGERIA 1996-2006: A SouRCEBOOK, supra note 26 at 188-90. 
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periodic judicial circulars-and uncodified sources can also be 
invoked.28 
There is thus little clarity, and even less uniformity, in the 
"Islamic" rules of criminal procedure that modem states refer to 
and apply when practicing Islamic criminal law. 
II. THE CA.sE FOR "IsLM.nc" CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
It is no aberration in world history that pre-modern Muslim 
jurists did not provide a template for criminal procedure; detailed 
rules for the criminal process-and certainly rules that specify limi-
tations on state power and protections for suspects and defend-
ants-are a relatively recent phenomenon in the West itself.29 The 
result of the absence of such a body of rules in pre-modern Islamic 
jurisprudence, however, coupled with the absence of a modern 
articulation of one, is that the states of the modern Muslim world 
that practice Islamic criminal law do so in the absence of an estab-
lished system of "Islamic" criminal procedure-including rules that 
limit state power and provide rights and protections for suspects 
and defendants-deriving from Islam and corresponding with the 
substance and theory of Islamic crimes and punishments. 
At first blush, this might not appear to pose a problem. The 
imported constitutions and codes contain, as noted above, some 
version of the limitations and protections that are considered fun-
damental in the criminal process today-requiring warrants for 
searches and seizures, guaranteeing notice of criminal charges and 
the opportunity to mount a defense, providing a right to counsel, 
guaranteeing a fair and public trial, and so forth. 30 These rules 
generally apply to investigations and prosecutions of Islamic crimes 
as well as those of "non-Islamic" crimes.31 Moreover, most of these 
states are also parties to international covenants that mandate 
these limitations and protections, such as the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1984 Convention 
28. See AHARON LAYISH & GABRIEL R. WARBURG, THE REINSTATEMENT OF ISLAMIC LAw IN 
SUDAN UNDER NUMAYRI: AN EVALUATION OF A LEGAL EXPERIMENT IN THE LIGHT OF ITS HIS-
TORICAL CoNTEXT, METHODOLOGY, AND REPERCUSSIONS 77, 98-115, 127-28, 174-75 (2002). 
29. It was not until the late eighteenth century that, for instance, England settled on 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof in criminal trials, JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE 
ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 22-23 (2003), continental Europe fully eliminated 
torture as a routine investigative method, JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAw OF 
PROOF 3 (2006), and the United States enumerated its list of protections for criminal sus-
pects and defendants in the Bill of Rights, U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, VII (which 
France followed soon thereafter in the Declaration of the Rights of Man). 
30. See FARANI, supra note 18, at 38. 
31. See id. 
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Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment.32 Muslim-majority countries have also adopted "Islamic" 
declarations of human rights, such as the 1981 Universal Islamic 
Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR), the 1990 Cairo Declara-
tion on Human Rights in Islam, and the 1994 Arab Charter on 
Human Rights (revised in 2004) .33 All of these declarations 
include some version of the litany of modern rules of criminal due 
process; all of them assert that these rules are compatible with 
Islamic law, indeed grounded in it. 34 
Even without these laws and treaties, one might ask: what need is 
there for a code of "Islamic" criminal procedure, if God did not see 
fit to specify one in the Quran, the Prophet and his Companions 
did not provide one in the Sunna, classical scholars did not articu-
late one in their jurisprudence, pre-modern Muslim states appar-
ently managed fine without one, and modern states now have 
Western rules and Islamic restatements to rely on? 
I suggest three reasons why the practice of Islamic criminal law 
today needs an accompanying set of "Islamic" rules of criminal pro-
cedure drawn from Islamic law and principles. First, criminal pro-
cedure rules of Western origin (i.e., of non-Islamic provenance) 
are vulnerable to attack or dismissal as inauthentic, illegitimate, or 
simply irrelevant to the practice of Islamic criminal law.35 The 
enforcement of these rules, and perhaps even their continued exis-
32. See 4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATI 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/ pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4& 
chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Status of International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights); Convention Against Tmture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, UNITED NATIONS TREATI COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (status of 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment). 
33. See Islamic Council of Eur., Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (Sept. 19, 
1981), available at http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html; Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (Aug. 5, 1990); League of Arab 
States, Arab Charter on Human Rights (Sept. 15, 1994). 
34. For more on the relationship between these instruments and Islamic law, see 
Sadiq Reza, Tmture and Islamic Law, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 21 (2007). 
35. ABDULLAH( AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE 4, 9-10 (2008) 
(" [T] he religious beliefs of Muslims, whether as officials of the state or as private citizens, 
always influence their actions and political behavior," and "[t]he Qur'an and Sunna are ... 
where Muslims look for guidance in developing their social and political relations, legal 
norms, and institutions."); Frank Griffel, Introduction, in SHARI'A: ISLAMIC LAw IN THE CoN-
TEMPORARY CONTEXT 1 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007) ("All normative discus-
sions within Islam, as well as between Muslims and members of other faiths, center on the 
content of Shari'a."); KEcIA Au, SEXUAL ETHICS IN IsLAM xii (2006) ("For the vast majority 
of Muslims world-wide-not only extremists or conservatives, but also those who consider 
themselves moderate or progressive-determining whether a particular belief or practice 
is acceptable largely hinges on deciding whether or not it is legitimately 'Islamic.'"); FRANK 
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tence and application to Islamic criminal law, is far from secure in 
the current wave of Islamization (and any future one).36 Second, 
the "Islamic" declarations of human rights that follow Western 
models themselves state that they are subject to definition and 
qualification by Islamic rules or principles-but they do not list 
those rules or principles, let alone explain their import. For 
instance, the UIDHR says that the rights and freedoms it contains 
are "subject ... to such limitations as are enjoined by the Law," and 
it defines "the Law" as "the Shari'ah, i.e. the totality of ordinances 
derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah and any other laws that 
are deduced from these two sources by methods considered valid 
in Islamic jurisprudence."37 Citations to the Quran or Sunna for 
each article appear at the end of the document, in ostensible sup-
port, but what rule or principle results from these supporting 
sources is far from clear.38 Similarly, the 1990 Cairo Declaration 
lists several rights that are familiar in the criminal-procedure con-
text-for instance, personal privacy, presumption of innocence, 
and freedom from arbitrary arrest-but then says in a short penul-
timate provision: "All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this 
Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah."39 Nowhere does 
the Declaration indicate what the sharia says about the rights and 
freedoms it lists, although it concludes with another short provi-
E. VOGEL & SAMUEL HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAw AND FINANCE 20 (1998) ("Islamic law remains-
in faith if not in legal reality-the criterion for right action in Muslim life."). 
36. Of course, Muslim-majority countries do not necessarily follow even those crimi-
nal procedure rules the legitimacy of which they do not contest. But in that respect they do 
not differ from non-Muslim-majority countries. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE LJ. 1935, 1940, 1942 (2002) (finding "not a 
single treaty for which ratification seems to be reliably associated with better human rights 
practices and several for which it appears to be associated with worse practices," and con-
cluding that "expressions of commitment to human rights through treaty ratification may 
sometimes relieve pressure on states to pursue real changes in their policies and thereby 
undermine the instrumental aims of those very same treaties"). 
3 7. Islamic Council of Eur., Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, 2 J. ISLAMIC L. 
1, 16 (1981). 
38. See id. at 18. For instance, on the "Right to Fair Trial," the citations listed for the 
five provisions of that article are eight Quranic verses and two unspecified reports from the 
Sunna. Id. at 9-10. On the two provisions of the article that speak directly to fair trials, the 
two closest Quranic verses add nothing: one simply tells Muslims to avoid conjecture, 53:28 
(in religious matters, no less), and the other instructs them to "ascertain the truth" when a 
person of bad character (fasiq) reports on others' alleged misbehavior, 49:6. An English 
translation of the Quran can be found in THE QuR'AN (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
39. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, supra note 33, arts. 18, 19, 20, 24. 
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sion that states that the sharia is "the only source of reference for 
the explanation or clarification" of the Declaration.40 
Thus, the existing "Western" templates for criminal procedure 
are on insecure footing, and neither they nor their "Islamic" 
restatements tell us what the sharia says on the matter. Moreover, 
the sharia does indeed discuss criminal procedure-which is the 
third and perhaps the best reason for identifying "Islamic" rules of 
criminal procedure. Although no system of criminal procedure 
appears in the Quran and the Sunna, values, principles, and some 
specific rules that should apply in criminal procedure-as they do 
anywhere else in Islamic law and practice-do in fact appear in 
those texts.41 This point is even stronger with respect to classical 
jurisprudence: although classical Muslim scholars did not articu-
late a system of criminal procedure, they did set out rules for the 
process, and they repeatedly invoked the authority of the Quran, 
the Sunna, and Islamic principles generally in support of these 
rules. Examples of these rules and principles come in Part III 
below. The point here is that to enforce Islam's criminal prohibi-
tions and mete out the prescribed punishments without heeding 
the accompanying procedural rules is arguably to practice Islamic 
criminal law inaccurately and incompletely-indeed, "unislami-
cally"-and thus to reach results that might be urtjust from an 
Islamic perspective, even if the standards of Western-inspired rules 
and principles of criminal procedure are satisfied. 
Here a fourth reason might be mentioned, though this one 
draws its power more from the ideology of human rights than that 
of Islam (and for that reason, I do not rely on it). In many cases, 
though certainly not all, the pertinent rules or principles we find in 
pre-modern Islamic sources and practice actually limit law-enforce-
ment powers in criminal matters-particularly in crimes and pun-
ishments of textual provenance-more than the rules and 
standards of contemporary Western/international practice do. As 
a result, they are more protective of individual liberties than those 
40. Id. art. 25. Hence Ann Mayer obseives that the Cairo Declaration and its ilk 
"[are] ultimately more intelligible in terms of the politics of human rights than in. terms of 
Islamic theology and Jaw," and that the rights contained in them "are not original but are 
borrowed from international Jaw and then qualified or distorted." Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 
Islam and Human Rights Policy, in ISLAM AND THE EVERYDAY WORLD: PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMAS 
66, 69, 71 (Sohrab Behdad & Farhad Nomani eds., 2007). 
41. One well-known example comes in a series of "letters to judges" said to have been 
authored by Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second successor to the Prophet as leader of the 
Muslim community. An English translation of the best-known and most pertinent of these 
letters is in FRANKE. VoGEL, IsLAMIC LA.w AND LEGAL SYSTEM 15 (2000). 
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of contemporary Western/international law. For many, this alone 
might suffice to justify this inquiry, since an inevitable result should 
be greater compliance with human-rights norms in Islamic crimi-
nal practice. 
Still, a likely objection to the project is this: to identify Islamic 
rules and principles of criminal procedure is to endorse what 
much of the modern world sees as an inhumane system of crime 
and punishment, indeed to encourage it. In other words: why not 
argue against Islamic criminal law as a whole, rather than propose 
adjustments to its practice? My response is two-fold. First, to ques-
tion the theory or practice of Islamic criminal law is nothing new; 
prominent Muslim voices have long done this, and they continue 
to do so.42 Second, Muslims who practice or advocate Islamic crim-
inal law deeply and genuinely believe in that law as a divine man-
date.43 To challenge that belief-for one's starting point to be the 
denial of what many Muslims believe God and the Prophet 
ordained about crime and punishment in, respectively, the Quran 
and the Sunna (not to mention the rejection of fourteen hundred 
years of venerated literature on the matter)-is to close the ears of 
these Muslims before one has begun speaking.44 In other words, 
the commitment to Islamic criminal practice among Muslims-not 
all Muslims, but certainly those who urge or support that prac-
tice-is unshakeable, for present purposes at least, and it must be 
seen that way and addressed accordingly. Stated differently: argu-
ments from within the Islamic tradition, not arguments against that 
tradition, are necessary if one wishes to reach an audience of 
devout Muslims.45 Nor, accordingly, can arguments from within 
the Islamic tradition be easily dismissed, whatever one's purpose in 
42. For two of the most authoritative efforts in modem times, see Fazlur Rahman, The 
Concept of Hadd in Islamic Law, 4 lsIAMIC STUD. 237 (1965) (arguing against the standard 
juristic classification of hudud as criminal punishments); Tariq Ramadan, An International 
Call for Moratorium on Cmporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Penalty in the Islamic World, 
TARIQ RAMADAN (Apr. 5, 2005), http:/ /tariqramadan.com/blog/2005/04/05/an-intema 
tional-call-for-moratorium-on-corporal-punishment-stoning-and-the-death-penalty-in-the-is 
Jamie-world (calling for a moratorium on hudud punishments and urging scholarly discus-
sion of their textual and contextual grounds). 
43. See supra note 35. 
44. See, e.g., Tariq Ramadan, A Call for a Moratorium on Cmporal Punishment - The Debate 
in Review, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ISIAMJC THOUGHT: EXPLORING REFORM AND MUSLIM TRADI-
TION 163, 164 (Kari Vogt et al. eds., 2009) (discussing his 2005 call and Muslim reactions to 
it); TARIQ RAMADAN, RADICAL REFORM: ISIAMIC ETHICS AND LIBERATION 274-77 (2009) 
(same, in less detail). 
45. Naz Modirzadeh puts it well; criticizing what she deems the failure of interna-
tional human-rights organizations (INGOs) to engage appropriately with Islamic law in 
their analysis and reports as follows: 
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presenting them-hence this effort to identify the procedural rules 
and principles that Islam itself provides to govern criminal 
practice. 
There are many sources in which to seek such rules and princi-
ples. The starting-point is of course the Quran and the Sunna: as 
explained below, statements that bear on criminal procedure 
appear in both of these sacred sources, and numerous reports in 
the Sunna of criminal matters from the Prophet's time add perti-
nent precedents for modem practice that are especially authorita-
tive. Additional venerated sources from the early centuries of 
Islam are codes of conduct for judges (adab al-qadz), manuals to 
guide inspectors of markets and morals ( muhtasibs), collections of 
legal opinions (fatwas), and miscellaneous other legal literature.46 
Among this pre-modern literature are the monographs and trea-
tises of jurists whose names remain as familiar, and their writings as 
influential, to Muslims today as the names and writings of Franklin, 
Jefferson, and Madison are to Americans today-al-Ghazzali, al-
Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyya, and Ibn Farhun, to name a few. Modern 
times too are a resource: rich material lies in the statutes and juris-
prudence of some of the countries that practice Islamic criminal 
law today, material that remains mostly unexplored in the West.47 
And the efforts by contemporary Muslim thinkers to address 
aspects of criminal procedure from an Islamic perspective, men-
tioned above, are yet another resource, as are the "Islamic" human-
rights instruments mentioned above. 
Current INGO approaches risk creating situations in which Muslims must decide 
to either side with human rights or to side with God. Whatever its intrinsic 
appeal, international human rights law is unlikely to be favored in this ultimatum. 
[W]hen their choice is framed as an either/or, many Muslims may believe that 
they have no option but to choose God's law. 
Naz K Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: INGOs and the Battle for Muslim Hearts and 
Minds, 19 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 191, 230-31 (2006). See also supra note 35. 
46. For examples and discussions of these types of literature, see, e.g., Muhammad 
Ibrahim H.I. Surty, The Ethical Code and Organised Procedure of Early Islamic Law Courts, with 
Reference to al-Khassafs Adah al-Qadi, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ISLAM: JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IN 
THE SHARI'A, supra note 13, at 149, 150 (discussing al-Khassafs Adab al-Qadi and citing 
counts of between 63 and 121 such judicial codes extant); ABD Ar.-RAHMAN B. NASR Ar.-
SHAVZARI, THE BooK OF THE lsLAMic MARKET INSPECTOR (R.P. Buckley trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1999) (1946) (a muhtasib manual); Muhammad Khalid Masud et al., Muftis, Fatwas, 
and Islamic Legal Interpretation, in ISLA.'-HC LEGAL INTERPRETATION: Murr1s AND THEIR FATWAS 
3 (Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996) (discussing fatwas). 
47. For an excellent resource on modem sharia criminal practice in Nigeria, see 4, 5 
PHILIP OsTIEN & IBRAHIM NA'IYA SADA, SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 
1999-2006 (2007). 
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An overarching theoretical framework for the inquiry may be 
found in the quintet of interests that Muslim jurists have long rec-
ognized as the fundamental goals of the sharia. Articulated in vari-
ous formulations by classical jurists, i.e., by the fourteenth century 
CE, and still invoked regularly today, these are "the five essentials" 
or "interests" ( al-daruriyat or al-masalih al-khamsah) of the sharia: the 
protection of religion, life, intellect, reputation (or honor or line-
age), and property.48 These interests are already used to explain 
and encapsulate specific doctrines or bodies of Islamic law, includ-
ing the list of crimes that God saw fit to specify in the Quran and 
the Sunna-the hudud. Indeed, it is from the hudud that these 
interests are said to have been originally identified.49 There is thus 
every reason to employ them to articulate and embrace the rules 
and principles of criminal procedure that can be identified in the 
sacred texts and the jurisprudence that builds on them.50 
One more point needs elaboration before turning to the sources 
to identify specific rules and principles of "Islamic" criminal proce-
dure. My claims here ultimately are normative ones in the premise 
of this inquiry-Le., that such rules and principles should be recog-
nized and honored-and in its results. That is, my goal is to iden-
tify those rules and principles that the sources indicate are aspects 
of "proper" Islam-normatively desirable expressions of the relig-
ion. But the search for these norms spans sources that include his-
torical reports and normative assertions. This is because normative 
authority in Islamic law lies as much in historical practice-reports 
in the Sunna, most prominently-as it does in sources of more the-
oretical or expressly didactic bent, like the Quran or jurists' trea-
tises. More important than distinguishing between normative and 
historical grounds for a claim is identifying its source. Who pro-
vides the authority-God (in the Quran), the Prophet, a Compan-
ion or early jurist, or someone else? When did it come-in the 
Prophet's time (most authoritative), or some time later? In what 
48. See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law and Ethics in Islam: The Role of the Maqasid, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT: EXPLORING REFORM AND MUSLIM TRADITION, supra 
note 44, at 23, 27-28. There are various formulations of this list, especially as to the fourth 
of these five interests. Additions to the list have also been suggested, particularly in mod-
em times. See, e.g., id. at 43-44; Gudrun Kramer, justice in Modern Islamic Thought, in 
SHARI'A: ISLAMIC LAw IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT, supra note 35, at 20, 23-34. 
49. See Kamali, supra note 48, at 27. 
50. Care must, of course, be taken not to stretch or apply these articulations, or any of 
their constituent concepts, in such a way as to make them foreign to their original contexts 
and meanings, or to use them merely as heuristic devices through which to claim an 
Islamic pedigree for rules and principles that arguably have none. For a careful and well-
researched warning in this regard, see Kramer, supra note 48, at 36-37. 
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context did it arise-for our purposes: in an actual criminal case, in 
a discussion of state power or religious authority, or in some other 
context? Sources of all types and times can constitute or provide 
normative authority in Islam, for this inquiry as for any other. Ulti-
mately, however, it is for Muslims to decide-individually and col-
lectively, according to what they find authoritative-what the 
religion commands, urges, discourages, or prohibits. 
III. A STARTING POINT: FOUR PRINCIPLES 
This Part begins the task of identifying rules and principles of 
due process that the Quran, Sunna, and classical jurisprudence set 
out to govern the enforcement of the criminal prohibitions and 
penalties that those same sources specify. Four such rules or prin-
ciples are discussed here, each bearing on a discrete aspect of the 
criminal process chronologically and conceptually. These aspects 
are: (1) investigation, which encompasses searches and seizures, 
interrogations, and other methods state officials employ to detect 
crime, identify suspected offenders, and collect evidence; (2) pros-
ecution, which includes deciding what criminal charges to bring 
against an alleged offender and formally proceeding with those 
charges; (3) adjudication, which means the process of reaching a 
verdict according to evidence (facts) introduced at trial and the 
governing legal rules; and ( 4) imprisonment, which can be a form 
of punishment but can also occur before an offender is convicted 
(i.e., pretrial detention). For each of these aspects, the rule or 
principle discussed has been selected because of its prominence in 
the classical sources and its representativeness as a rule that bears 
on enforcing Islam's criminal prohibitions and penalties but 
appears to be ignored today. No single theme fully unites the list 
that follows, but one common thread stands out and perhaps pre-
dominates: how many obstacles are erected to investigating, prose-
cuting, and punishing a person for violating any of the most 
serious of sharia crimes (i.e., the hudud'). 
A. Investigation: Honor Privacy 
From two simple rules in the Quran, several related reports in 
the Sunna, and pertinent doctrines classical jurists derived from 
these rules and reports, this maxim emerges clearly: personal pri-
vacy must be honored in the process of detecting crime and investi-
gating criminal suspects. This principle restrains private citizens as 
well as state officials, and it is to be followed even when that means 
forgoing an investigation, and thus permitting a crime to go 
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unprosecuted and unpunished; indeed, even when it means 
allowing criminal behavior that is underway to continue. The 
Quranic rules are simple: "Enter not houses other than your own, 
until you have asked permission and saluted those in them," and 
"[s]py not on each other."51 The Sunna repeats and elaborates on 
these rules in several reports. For example, regarding the "enter 
not without permission" verse, the Prophet specifies appropriate 
and inappropriate methods of satisfying the permission require-
ment, as well as exceptions to the requirement and possible penal-
ties for violating it.52 Regarding the "spy not" verse, the Prophet 
restates and expands on the command, and provides examples of 
the forbidden act-for instance, eavesdropping and reading 
others' correspondence-and again suggests possible penalties for 
non-compliance. 53 
Respect for the personal privacy of fellow Muslims is the thrust of 
these commands; this is evident in commentary about the cited 
Quranic verses that one finds in works of tafsir (exegesis) and asbab 
al-nuzul ("occasions of revelation"), and it is self-evident in the 
Sunna reports.54 Other Sunna reports also make it clear that the 
commands apply in criminal investigations as much as anywhere 
else, and that their effect is to restrain state officials in those investi-
gations. 55 The best known of these reports involve Umar ibn al-
Khattab, the second leader (caliph) of the Muslim community after 
the Prophet's death.56 Three separate anecdotes in the Sunna 
depict Umar as declining to act on wrongdoing; specifically, wine 
drinking and accompanying revelry he witnesses by entering the 
wrongdoers' homes without permission and surreptitiously-
thereby violating the Quran's "enter not" and "spy not" com-
mands.57 Another report from the Sunna suggests a principle that 
emerges from this authority and unites/animates it. Ibn Mas'ud, 
another Companion of the Prophet, when told that a certain per-
son's beard was "dripping with wine," reportedly said: "We have 
51. Qur'an 24:27, 49:12. The first verse is followed by Qur'an 24:28, which continues 
as follows: 
That is best for you, in order that you may heed (what is seemly). If you find no 
one in the house, enter not until permission is given to you; if you are asked to go 
back, go back. That makes for greater purity for yourselves, and God knows well 
all that you do. 
52. Reza, supra note 16, at 724. 
53. Id. at 724-25. 
54. See id. at 792-95. 
55. See id. at 749-50. 
56. See id. at 725. 
57. Id. at 725-27. 
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been prohibited from seeking out [others' faults]; but if something 
becomes manifest to us, we can seize it."58 In other words, wrong-
doing that is committed openly may be pursued; but wrongdoing 
that is not may not. 
Classical jurists accordingly articulated doctrines of restraint in 
criminal investigation based on this principle. These doctrines typ-
ically appear in discussions of the duties and powers of an official 
called the muhtasib, whose job was to walk the streets of Muslim 
cities to police residents' markets and morals.59 Two of the best 
known of these discussions are in works by al-Ghazzali and al-
Mawardi. 60 Both discussions invoke the Quranic and Sunna texts 
above (along with others) to set limits on the muhtasib's investiga-
tive powers, beginning with a rule that echoes lbn Mas'ud's state-
ment in the Sunna report above: the muhtasib may not act on 
wrongdoing that is not public or "manifest" (zahir)-i.e., wrongdo-
ing that is apparent without entering a home or spying.61 This rule 
has corollaries as well as exceptions. One corollary is that the 
muhtasib may not seize or search suspected wrongdoers themselves 
without a specified quantum of individualized suspicion-a "partic-
ular sign" of guilt ( 'alamah khassah), in al-Ghazzali's formulation. 62 
Another is that homes in which wrongdoing is suspected may not 
be entered as long as evidence of the wrongdoing-the sounds of 
drunken revelry, for instance-does not travel outside of the 
home.63 One exception, meanwhile, is that the muhtasib may enter 
a home if, in al-Mawardi's version, there is "indicative evidence" 
( amarat dallat) that a serious crime such as adultery or homicide is 
underway.64 But beneath this threshold (which is stated somewhat 
differently in al-Ghazzali's formulation},65 and from other state-
ments about the muhtasib's powers in these works and others, the 
message is clear: muhtasibs are generally forbidden to intervene in 
the private lives of fellow Muslims, even to enforce the religious 
prohibitions that are central to their duties. 
58. Id. at 725. This apparently meant that the drinker and his drink were to be left 
alone because no one had witnessed the act of drinking. See id. at 789. 
59. Id. at 733. 
60. See AL-MAWARDI, THE ORDINANCES OF GOVERNMENT 260-80 (Wafaa H. Wahba 
trans., Garnet 1996). Unfortunately, a reliable English translation of the relevant chapter 
of al-Ghazzali's work does not appear to be available. See Reza, supra note 16, at 737 n.106. 
61. Reza, supra note 16, at 737; see AL-MAWARDI, supra note 60, at 260, 273. 
62. Reza, supra note 16, at 739. 
63. Id. 
64. AL-MAWARDI, supra note 60, at 273. 
65. Reza, supra note 16, at 738. 
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B. Prosecution: Forgo Instead 
Several reports in the Sunna reflect a preference that hudud 
crimes-for all their seriousness, and even if they satisfy the 
"manifestness" requirement discussed above-not be prosecuted at 
all. 66 Statements of this preference are directed especially toward 
citizens who know of hudud violations, including citizens who were 
personally harmed by them.67 One report to this effect describes 
the Prophet as first laboring to avoid hearing a confession of adul-
tery by a young man named Ma'iz, then regretting having to pun-
ish him, and finally chastising those who sent Ma'iz to him in the 
first place.68 There are various versions of this report, and the 
details of the Prophet's exchange with Ma'iz vary.69 But in most 
versions, the Prophet repeatedly turns away from Ma'iz when he 
comes to him to confess, evidently giving Ma'iz the opportunity to 
abandon the enterprise and return home. One version even has 
the Prophet cross-examining Ma'iz with suggestions that he might 
be mistaken about his own guilt: "Perhaps you [only] kissed, or 
squeezed, or looked?"70 But Ma'iz persists, and after he has con-
fessed four times-and thus matched the number of witnesses 
required to prove the hadd crime of adultery-the Prophet finds 
Ma'iz guilty and accordingly orders him to be stoned to death. 71 
The Prophet then turns to the person who urged Ma'iz to come to 
him and says: "If you had covered him with your garment, it would 
have been better for you."72 In other words, the fellow Muslims 
should have kept Ma'iz's wrongdoing to themselves, rather than 
pushing Ma'iz to be adjudicated, found guilty, and punished.73 
Another report in this vein tells us that one of the Prophet's 
Companions, Safwan ibn Umayyah, brought a man to the Prophet 
for adjudication and punishment for stealing Safwan's cloak.74 
The Prophet found the man guilty and ordered the hadd punish-
66. See, e.g., Anu DAwun, KlTAJl AL-HUDUD [PRESCRlllED PUNISHMENTS] book 38, no. 
4405 (Ahmad Hasan trans., Ctr. for Muslim:Jewish Engagement), available at http:/ /www 
.usc.edu/ org/ cmje/ religious-texts/hadith/ abudawud/038-sat.php. 
67. See id. 
68. Id. 
69. Compare id., with id. no. 3643. 
70. Id. no. 4413. 
71. Id. no. 4412. 
72. Id. no. 4364. 
73. See id. In a similar report, a man caught for theft admitted the crime, but had 
none of the stolen goods. Id. no. 4367. \-\'hen he was brought to Prophet Muhammad, the 
Prophet expressed doubt about his guilt until the man repeated his confession. Id. 
74. AL-TIRMIDHI, HADITH 1020 (Alim.org), available at http://www.alim.org/library/ 
hadith/TIR/ 1020. 
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ment of amputating the man's hand.75 Before the amputation, 
SafWan implored the Prophet to remit the punishment, and the 
Prophet's response was: "Why did you not do [this intercession] 
before bringing him to me?"76 The Companions apparently 
learned this lesson well. 
Yet another report along these lines involves a different Com-
panion, Uqba ibn Amir al:Juhani, who served as a governor in 
Egypt.77 Uqba's secretary told the governor he had neighbors who 
drank wine-another hadd crime-and proposed summoning the 
police to arrest them.78 Uqba told the secretary not to do that, but 
rather to "counsel" and "threaten" the neighbors to amend their 
conduct. 79 The secretary complied; but the neighbors continued 
their wrongdoing, so the secretary again proposed calling the 
police.80 Uqba rejected the idea again, and this time quoted a tra-
dition he had heard from the Prophet: "He who sees something 
which should be kept hidden and conceals it will be like one who 
has brought to life a girl buried alive."81 
These anecdotes, taken together, stand for the proposition that, 
for at least three of the hudud crimes-wine-drinking, theft, and 
adultery, which carry penalties of flogging, amputation, and ston-
ing to death, respectively-forgoing prosecution is urged, on the 
authority of the Prophet himself. To be sure, an opposite principle 
also traces back to the Prophet, but its reasoning arguably strength-
ens the point. The Prophet said, "Forgive the hudud in what is 
your affair; for whatever hadd reaches me is obligatory."82 The 
Prophet himself could not disregard hudud crimes, since punishing 
for them is a right of God (haqq Allah), and he was God's vice-
regent on earth; but for that very reason, fellow Muslims should 
avoid bringing them to his attention.8 ::1 Similarly, wrongdoers 
should not turn themselves in for prosecution; better they keep 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See AllU DAwun, KlTAll AL-ADAB [GENERAL BEHAVIOR] book 41, no. 4874 (Ahmad 
Hasan trans., Ctr. for Muslim:Jewish Engagement), available at http:/ /www.usc.edu/org/ 
cmje/religious-texts/hadith/abudawud/041-sat.php. 
78. See id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. nos. 4873, 4874. 
82. Vocn., supra note 41, at 243. 
83. See id. Still, there are also reports that suggest the opposite. For instance, 
"[w]hoever with his intercession prevents one of the hud(ld of God opposes God in His 
affair," id. at 242 (quoting Abu Dawud), and "[f]orgive the people of good qualities their 
slips, but not faults to which prescribed penalties apply," DAwuo, supra note 66, no. 4362. 
2013] Due Process in Islamic Criminal Law 21 
their peace and repent: "Let whoever attempts any of this rubbish 
[i.e., prohibited acts] hide himself from view as God admonished," 
said the Prophet, "for those who reveal themselves to us will have 
God's penalties enforced against them."84 Officials, then, might 
have to prosecute hudud crimes and punish offenders to effectuate 
God's wishes; but for that very reason, citizens are urged not to 
bring hudud violations by their fellow Muslims to officials' 
attention. 
C. Adjudication: ''Avoid the Hudud" 
Even when hudud crimes are prosecuted, another legal principle 
stands in the way of convicting defendants of them and meting out 
the commensurate punishments. Jurists since the earliest centuries 
of Islam have quoted the Prophet as having said, "[a]void [the 
hudud punishments] in cases of doubt or ambiguity."85 This 
instruction not only echoes the advice to forgo hadd prosecutions, 
but both impels and summarizes a host of procedural obstacles-
legal presumptions, rules of evidence, testimonial hurdles, and 
more-to reaching verdicts of guilt when those prosecutions are 
undertaken. For instance, according to this principle, when adju-
dicating a hadd crime, the judge ( qadi) must scrutinize the case for 
any factual or legal "doubt" (shubhah) as to the defendant's guilt, 
for the very purpose of "seek[ing] a pretext to prevent punish-
ment."86 Any failure of the elements or evidence of the crime bars 
the hadd conviction and punishment (although discretionary and 
lesser ta'zir punishments might still be applicable).87 
In a prosecution for adultery, for example, such a failure of 
proof might lie in the following: intercourse that is other than vagi-
nal, since the Quranic proof requires that the adultery be of the 
type that could produce offspring;88 a defendant's mistaken belief 
that intercourse was lawful-i.e., the parties' marriage proves tech-
nically deficient, or their divorce is complete but the defendant 
thought otherwise;89 and accusations that are not lodged within a 
84. AL-MAWARDI, THE ORDINANCES OF GovERNMENT 260-80 (Wafaa H. Wahba trans., 
Garnet 1996). 
85. Various versions of the statement have been reported and adopted by most 
schools of Islamic law; but the prophetic pedigree of each version is apparently weak or 
nonexistent. See Intisar A. Rabb, Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction: 
Hudud-Avoidance in Cases of Doubt, 17 lsIAMIC L. & Soc'v 63, 65-67 (2010). 
86. Tm: HEDAYA 176 (Charles Hamilton trans., 1870, Islamic Book Tmst 1982). 
87. See, e.g., id. at 184. 
88. See id. at 185. 
89. See id. at 182-84. 
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specified period of time, since delay raises doubts about the 
motives of the accusers, and thus about a standard requirement of 
witness testimony: the witnesses' moral probity (adalah). 90 Should 
four witnesses qualify to testify,91 factual inconsistencies among 
their testimony-regarding, for instance, the location of the 
alleged act of unlawful intercourse, or the identity of the defen-
dant's partner-raise doubt sufficient to preclude hadd punish-
ment.92 And of course, if the testimony of one of the necessary 
four witnesses is inadmissible or legally insufficient, the remaining 
three witnesses are liable for punishment of the hadd crime of 
qadhf, false accusation of adultery.93 Similarly, a defendant's con-
fession to adultery, which may substitute for the requisite four wit-
nesses, must be given four times in four separate sessions to better 
identify any factual or legal insufficiency in the testimony.94 Even 
after that, the hadd penalty must be withheld if the defendant 
retracts his confession, since the retraction creates doubt as to his 
guilt.95 
The same or similar rules govern adjudicating other hadd crimes, 
with examples of factual or legal doubt tailored accordingly.96 And 
lest there be any doubt that the principle, and the many rules that 
embody it, aim specifically at avoiding hudud punishments-that it 
reflects and commands a genuine aversion to inflicting the most 
serious of God's criminal penalties, rather than simply cautions 
prudence in adjudicating hadd crimes-consider this additional 
language that is found in one version of it: "It is better for the ruler 
(imam) to err in pardon than to err in punishment."97 A mistaken 
acquittal, in other words, is preferable to a mistaken conviction 
and punishment, at least when it comes to hadd crimes. Surely, it is 
the very harshness of hadd punishments that commends this corol-
90. See id. at 188-89. A routine inquiry into witnesses' moral probity should always be 
conducted in secret as well as in public, in order to better uncover character flaws that 
would nullify a witness's testimony. See id. at 176. The reason being is that if a defendant is 
punished with hadd, and thereafter one of the supporting witnesses is discovered to have 
had insufficient moral probity to have properly permitted his testimony, the state or the 
court-appointed "character investigator" (muzakkz) who declared the witness qualified is 
liable to the defendant for damages. See id. at 191, 193. 
91. Four witnesses are requisite to substantiate a conviction for adultery. See id. at 176. 
92. See id. at 190. 
93. See id. at 191. 
94. See id. at 177. 
95. See id. at 178. 
96. See, e.g., id. at 195-97 (wine drinking); id. at 197-203 (false accusation of adul-
tery); id. at 205-13 (theft). 
97. See VOGEL, supra note 41, at 243. 
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lary principle.98 Thus, when it comes to the most serious transgres-
sions of God's law, Muslim jurists have spent the better part of 
fourteen hundred years urging qadis Uudges) and imams (leaders) 
to find reasons to avoid convicting and punishing alleged 
offenders. 
D. Punishment: Routinely Question All Prisoners to Determine 
the Lawfulness of Their Detention 
Imprisonment is not among the hadd penalties in the classical 
template of Islamic criminal law. Rather, it is a discretionary pun-
ishment (ta 'zir) that is available when proof of a hadd crime fails, or 
criminal conduct falls outside of hadd categories.99 Detention is 
also authorized before trial, in most views, for interrogation or sim-
ply to hold defendants until their cases are adjudicated.100 Also, 
outside of criminal cases-in pre-modem times in Muslim lands 
and elsewhere-individuals could be imprisoned for the non-pay-
ment of debts.101 
Whatever the rationale for imprisonment, those who were 
imprisoned received special attention from classical Muslim jurists, 
most notably in a rule that apparently originated with the Hanafi 
jurist al-Khassaf. 102 Upon assuming office, al-Khassaf said in his 
Adab al-Qadi (Rules for the Judge), every qadi must visit the prisons, 
record the names of inmates and the dates of their imprisonment, 
and inquire into the reason for each inmate's imprisonment.103 
The qadi must ask each inmate himself why he is detained, and if 
any inmate claims his imprisonment is unlawful, the qadi must 
investigate further. 104 This is, of course, an extraordinary version 
of what Anglo-American law knows as the writ of habeas corpus. 105 
Unlike that writ, however, the inquiry in the Islamic context is con-
sidered a routine requirement of every new judge, with respect to 
every prison inmate. Indeed, so central is it to the judicial function 
98. It is hard to avoid mentioning the analogous principle in Anglo-American law, 
indeed perhaps the most famous aphorism of that law-namely, Blackstone's: "It is better 
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *352. 
99. VOGEL, supra note 41, at 247-48. 
100. Reza, supra note 16, at 752-59. 
101. Irene Schneider, Imprisonment in Pre-Classical and Classical Islamic Law, 2 lsLAMIC L. 
& Soc'y 157, 165 (1995). 
102. See IMAM KHA.ssAF, AoAB AL-QADI [RULES FOR THEjUDGE] 128-39 (Munir Ahmad 
Mughal trans., Adam Publishers & Distributors 2005) (in English). 
103. See id. at 128-29. 
104. See id. at 128-33. 
105. See U.S. CONST. art I., §9, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (2006). 
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in Islamic jurisprudence that the Shafi'i jurist al-Nawawi, in his 
Minhaj et Tali bin, lists it as the very first thing a new qadi should do 
upon assuming office. 106 
* * * 
Of course, the sources yield many other rules and principles that 
bear on the criminal process, and not all of them are limits. Nor 
are the four discussed above absolute in any sense; for each, there 
is also authority to the contrary.107 There is also no claim that any 
of them has been routinely practiced in the hundreds of years 
since they were set out by God, the Prophet, his Companions, or 
any classical jurist. But that is precisely the point: due process rules 
and principles found in the Quran and the Sunna might be 
ignored in the contemporary practice of Islamic criminal law in 
part because they went unrecognized and unpracticed over the 
lands and centuries of Islam-lands and centuries in which, for 
Muslims and for the rest of the world, power rather than principle 
defined and shaped the everyday exchange between rulers and 
their subjects, whatever religious scholars and others had to say 
about that exchange. 
The goal of this inquiry is thus to re-introduce these rules and 
principles to sharia scholars and practitioners, with pertinent 
authority. Further works of various kinds must follow-to add to 
the list, as well as to explore further those already on the list; to 
search the historical record for evidence of the practice vel non of 
these rules and principles; to explore whether they are honored 
today in the countries that claim to practice Islamic criminal law; 
and most importantly, to make them so honored. Meanwhile, 
some observations on the findings above are in order. 
IV. OBSERVATIONS 
Suggested in the first three of the rules or principles presented 
in Part III is a general aversion toward investigating, prosecuting, 
and punishing individuals for hadd crimes. 108 And the fourth rule 
reflects an awareness of the ever-present possibility-indeed the 
inevitability-of instances of unlawful imprisonment and a staunch 
commitment to minimizing their occurrence and length. 
Together, the four show a great wariness of criminal proceedings 
106. NAWAWI, MINHAJ ET TALIBIN: A MANUAL OF MuHAMMADA.."I LAw ACCORDING TO THE 
SCHOOL OF SHAFI! 503-04 (E.C. Howard trans., W. Thacker & Co. 1914). 
107. See supra note 83. 
108. See supra Part III. 
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in general and several discrete components of them in particular: 
the exercise of official power in applying them, the behavior of 
private parties in initiating them, and the punishment of individu-
als pursuant to them. 
Such a wariness of official judgment pervades Islamic literature 
on legal proceedings. "One who is appointed qadi is as slaugh-
tered without a knife," goes a well-known prophetic Tradition, and 
another one elaborates: "Qadis are three: two in the Fire, and one 
in Paradise."109 Even judging well does not protect a Muslim 
unfortunate enough to be in the position of doing it: "The just 
qadi will be brought on the Judgment Day, and confronted with 
such a harsh accounting that he will wish he had never judged 
between any two, even as to a single date."110 Little wonder then 
that some early Muslim legal scholars reportedly went to great 
lengths to avoid formal judicial appointments, especially as the 
office became increasingly subject to control by political authori-
ties.111 It is even less wonder that jurists articulated doctrines and 
principles like the third of those presented above ("avoid the 
hudud"), which makes it difficult to convict individuals of hudud 
crimes, and the fourth ("question all prisoners"), which ensures 
regular opportunities to correct erroneous imprisonment. Nor are 
these the only examples of such jurist-generated doctrines. 112 
But the wariness of judgment in Islamic criminal law does not 
begin with jurists; rather it originates with God and the Prophet, in 
the Quran and the Traditions. It is the Traditions that underpin 
the second principle illustrated above ("forgo prosecution"); and 
the Quran precedes them in establishing the first one ("honor pri-
vacy"). The Quran even repeatedly commends forgiving hadd 
offenders who repent, rather than meting out the prescribed pun-
ishments, often in the very verses in which it prescribes those 
punishments. 113 
Why would the Quran encourage forgoing the very punishments 
it sets out for crimes, and the Prophet in turn discourage even 
109. VoGEL, supra note 41, at 20. 
110. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added). 
111. See NJ. Coulson, Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law: One Aspect of the Probl,em, 18 
BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL & AFRICAN STUD. 211, 211-12, 218-19 (1956). 
112. See THE HEDAYA, supra note 86, at 353-59 (discussing doctrines related to eviden-
tiary burdens). 
113. Qur'an 5:33-34 (remitting punishment for committers of mayhem who repent); 
Qur'an 5:38-39 (same for thieves); Qur'an 24:4-5 (false accusers); see also Qur'an 25:68, 
25:70 (remitting divine punishment for idolaters, murderers, and adulterers who repent 
before death). 
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investigating apd prosecuting individuals for those crimes, even as 
he adjudicated such cases and punished offenders accordingly? 
Why announce the crimes and punishments at all, then? One 
answer is that God did not mean for the hudud to be prosecuted by 
authorities at alt-i.e., that they are not really crimes. A more con-
ventional answer is that God announced the hudud as deterrents, 
but wanted convictions and punishment to be few and far between, 
given the severity of the penalties and the ever-present possibility of 
erroneous conviction. Yet another possible explanation for these 
procedural rules and principles that have the effect of hindering 
criminal proceedings is that they serve to protect other values that 
might too easily be forsaken in the zeal to prosecute and punish-
privacy and dignity, for instance-or to promote other social ends, 
such as (perhaps) a culture of resolving disputes privately or 
among the community rather than by bringing them to the atten-
tion of authorities. Or perhaps the explanation is a divine purpose 
that the believing Muslim cannot discern. Nevertheless, whatever 
the rationale for these rules and principles, it is certainly not vindi-
cated when a state enforces Islamic criminal law without heed for 
the duty of restraint these commands suggest. 
It also bears noting that the rules and principles discussed above 
exceed Western standards in limiting official powers in criminal 
law-enforcement. For instance, nothing like a "presumption of 
non-prosecution" is a typical feature of modern (Western) criminal 
procedure, although there are grounds for reduced sentences and 
other forms of leniency in certain circumstances.114 As for the 
muhtasib, rules that govern when and how law-enforcement officials 
may investigate suspected wrongdoing are certainly a central fea-
ture of Western criminal procedure; such rules are the focus of, for 
instance, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 115 But 
forbidding the investigation of "private" wrongdoing is not typically 
among those rules. Nor is the requirement that jails and prisons 
be routinely visited to confirm the lawfulness of each inmate's 
detention. 
This does not mean that all rules and principles of the criminal 
process that can be found in the primary sources and the jurispru-
dence of Islamic law will point in the "protective" direction sug-
114. There are, however, grounds for reduced sentences and other forms of leniency 
in certain circumstances. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. art II, §2, cl. 1 (presidential pardon power); 
18 U.S.C. § 3607 (2012) (authorizing probation and expungement procedures for first-
time drug possessors); U.S. DEP'T OF juSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY MANUAL ch. 9-22.000 (author-
izing probation instead of prosecution for qualifying offenders and offenses). 
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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gested in the above illustration, or that they will necessarily 
comport with modern (Western) sensibilities. On the matter of 
investigative torture, for instance, some reports in the Sunna argua-
bly authorize that abhorrent practice (while others appear to for-
bid it), and some influential classical jurists-al-Mawardi among 
them-declared the practice acceptable in at least some criminal 
investigations, while others deemed it forbidden. 116 But the possi-
bility that Islamic rules or principles of criminal procedure might 
be repugnant to modern sensibilities does not seem a good reason 
to avoid identifying them. Even if it were, all indications, I admit I 
am happy to report, are that the rules and principles one finds 
typically meet or exceed the protective standard of contemporary 
Western rules. This Article illustrated three examples; others 
include the presumption of innocence, the right of a defendant to 
retract a confession, and the requirement of the equivalent of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction. In the end, the 
Islamic crimes and punishments at issue are themselves repugnant 
to modern sensibilities; but we must grapple with them 
nonetheless. 
116. See Reza, supra note 34, at 24-25. 

